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THE USE OF UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL COURT
CONVICTIONS IN FEDERAL COURT UNDER THE
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROVISION OF THE
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT: A VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
OR AN EXTENSION OF COMITY?
Rebecca Zimmerman+
During the early hours of July 7, 2008, Roman Cavanaugh, a member of the
Spirit Lake Sioux Indian Tribe, was driving home with Amanda Luedtke,1 his
common-law wife, and three of their children.2 Both Cavanaugh and Luedtke
were intoxicated and began to argue.3 The fight escalated when Cavanaugh
grabbed Luedtke’s hair and repeatedly slammed her face into the dashboard.4
Afterward, with the children still in the car, Cavanaugh drove to a remote area
in North Dakota and threatened to kill Luedtke.5 Luedtke escaped by rolling
out of the car and hiding in the weeds alongside the road.6
Sadly, this was not Cavanaugh’s first time abusing or threatening his
partner.7 In fact, Cavanaugh had three prior convictions in the Spirit Lake
Tribal Court for domestic assault.8 However, when the North Dakota Assistant
United States Attorney charged Cavanaugh with domestic assault by a habitual
offender under 18 U.S.C. § 117,9 a provision of the Violence Against Women
+

J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, University of Virginia. The author would like to thank John Harte for his expertise
and sound advice on this area of law and the staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their
tireless efforts working on this paper. The author also wishes to express sincere gratitude to her
parents, Lee and Lisa Zimmerman, for their constant love and encouragement. This Comment is
dedicated to the memory of the author’s grandfather, Richard. P. McFeaters, who will be
remembered for his quick wit, stalwart patriotism, and dedication to his family.
1. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (D.N.D. 2009), rev’d, 643
F.3d 592, 606 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
2. See Brief for the United States at 4–5, Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (No. 10-1154).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
8. Id. The tribal court sentenced Cavanaugh to a term of imprisonment after each
conviction of domestic assault. Brief for the United States, supra note 2, at 6–7.
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006). The habitual offender provision of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) provides that
[a]ny person who commits a domestic assault within the . . . territorial jurisdiction of
the United States or Indian country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate
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Act (VAWA),10 the district court judge dismissed the case.11 The court held
that although Cavanaugh’s previous convictions were valid under tribal law12
and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),13 they were inadmissible in federal
court as evidence of prior convictions because Cavanaugh, an indigent
defendant,14 was not provided an attorney for those proceedings that resulted in
The district court judge concluded that Cavanaugh’s
incarceration.15
constitutional right to counsel would be violated if the court admitted his
previous uncounseled convictions in federal court.16 As a result, Cavanaugh
escaped a possible ten-year prison sentence.17 To the contrary, if Cavanaugh’s
prior convictions for domestic assault had been in state or federal court instead
of tribal court, he would have received counsel in accordance with the Sixth
Amendment,18 and barring any glaring irregularities, the district court judge
would have admitted his prior convictions for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
117.19

prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings for offenses that
would be, if subject to Federal jurisdiction . . . any assault, sexual abuse, or serious
violent felony against a spouse or intimate partner . . . shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for a term of not more than 5 years, or both, except that if substantial bodily
injury results from violation under this section, the offender shall be imprisoned for a
term of not more than 10 years.
Id. The statute defines domestic assault as “assault committed . . . by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the
victim as a . . . person similarly situated to a spouse.” 18 U.S.C. § 117(b).
10. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of VAWA and
Congress’s intent in passing the Act to enhance investigation and prosecution of violent crimes
perpetuated against women).
11. See Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1077 (granting Cavanaugh’s motion to dismiss in
part because using an uncounseled tribal court conviction to prove an element of a federal charge
violates the Constitution).
12. Id. at 1074 (citation omitted) (“The Spirit Lake Nation Law and Order Code does not
authorize court-appointed counsel at tribal expense. Instead, defendants in Spirit Lake Tribal
Court are advised that they have the right to an attorney at their own expense, which is in
accordance with the Indian Civil Rights Act.”).
13. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006); see also infra note 52 (providing the statutory text
of the Indian Civil Rights Act).
14. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 & n.1 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
court will not challenge Cavanaugh’s claim that he was indigent at the time of his prior
convictions), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
15. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1075–76 (stating that the use of a conviction that
violates the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to support guilt of another crime
is impermissible in federal court).
16. Id.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006) (providing that if “substantial bodily injury” results from
an offense, the punishment is imprisonment for up to ten years).
18. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. See Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d at 1076–77.
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Cavanaugh’s release is the curious result of Congress’s incomplete
application of the constitutional right to counsel in Indian tribal cases.20
Although the ICRA and the recent Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010
(TLOA)21 mandate that tribal governments provide indigent criminal
defendants with counsel in specific situations,22 due to their semi-sovereign
status,23 tribal governments are not obligated to provide counsel to the same
extent as federal and state courts.24 This has led to divergent opinions in the
federal courts as to the admissibility of prior uncounseled convictions as
evidence of prior offenses, most often to increase sentencing or to establish the
prior history element of a recidivist statute.
In 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision in Cavanaugh,25 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit came to a similar result in United States v. Shavanaux.26 Both
courts held that prior uncounseled domestic assault convictions in tribal court
satisfied the prior history element of the VAWA habitual offender provision.27
Explicit within each analysis was an emphasis on the unique quasi-sovereign
relationship between tribal nations and the federal government, as well as
Congress’s reluctance to extend full Sixth Amendment rights to Indians in the
context of their relationship with tribal governments.28 These decisions are
contrary to United States v. Ant,29 in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that an uncounseled guilty plea in tribal court was

20. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 604 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1542 (2012).
21. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202, 124 Stat. 2258,
2262–63 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2815 (Supp. IV 2010)); see also infra note
61 and accompanying text (explaining how the TLOA aims for tribal governments to increase
public safety).
22. See TLOA § 234(c)(1), 124 Stat. at 2280 (mandating that tribes must provide indigent
defendants with counsel when the charged offense may result in a sentence of imprisonment of
more than one year).
23. See infra notes 47–51 and accompanying text (explaining the quasi-sovereign status of
Indian tribes).
24. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that where actual imprisonment
is punishment for an offense, as opposed to a fine or threat of imprisonment, the right to counsel
shall be granted); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (ruling that absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, the defendant has a right to counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963) (finding the right to counsel in criminal proceedings fundamental to a fair hearing).
25. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
26. 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
27. See id. at 997 (providing that because the Bill of Rights is not applicable to Indian
tribes, the prior uncounseled tribal court convictions cannot violate the Sixth Amendment);
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 595–606.
28. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 997; Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 595–96.
29. 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 997 (recognizing that
the court in Ant reached a different legal conclusion on similar, although not identical, facts);
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604–05 (stating a similar proposition).
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inadmissible in federal court.30 In Ant, the Ninth Circuit relied on the United
States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Burgett v. Texas,31 in which the Court
found unconstitutional the use of a prior uncounseled conviction to inflate the
punishment of an offense under a recidivist statute.32 To date, neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court have provided guidance on this specific, yet
crucial, issue.33
This Comment traces the legal development of the use of uncounseled tribal
court convictions in federal court. Part One analyzes legal jurisprudence on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as applied to criminal defendants in
federal court. A discussion of the unique status of Indian tribes in the United
States follows, focusing particularly on the extent to which the ICRA applies
the right to counsel to Indians. Then, the Comment addresses recidivism in the
context of 18 U.S.C. § 117, the domestic assault habitual offender provision
under VAWA. Next, this Comment describes the varying Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuit approaches to whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
bars the use of uncounseled tribal court convictions as evidence in federal
court to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 117’s prior history element. An analysis of each
court’s reasoning follows, with specific attention paid to the Burgett approach
and principles of comity. This Comment concludes by advocating for an
extension of comity to uncounseled domestic assault convictions in tribal court
and for allowing admittance of such convictions in federal court to establish
prior offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 117. At the same time, the Comment
recognizes and encourages the need to temper such full recognition of the
uncounseled tribal convictions by requiring federal courts to perform a
preliminary review of the prior convictions for any due process violations.
I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL, TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, AND A
CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Development of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an essential safeguard necessary to
protect against “arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights.”34 Initially,
30. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396.
31. 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
32. Id.; see also Ant, 882 F.2d at 1393.
33. See e.g., Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605 (“Supreme Court authority in this area is unclear;
reasonable decision-makers may differ in their conclusions.”). In 2012, the Supreme Court
denied the petitions for writs of certiorari in Shavanaux and Cavanaugh, thus passing on the
opportunity to shed light on the issue and provide clarification. Cavanaugh v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 1542 (2012); Shavanaux v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
34. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), overruled on other grounds in Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Zerbst, the trial court convicted an unrepresented defendant for
possession and use of counterfeit money and sentenced the defendant to four and a half years in
prison. Id. at 459. On review of the defendant’s petition for a writ of habeus corpus, Justice
Hugo Black expounded the significance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel:
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courts interpreted the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as granting defendants
the freedom to hire an attorney to assist in their defense.35 Over time, this
interpretation evolved such that an attorney must be provided to a defendant in
order to guarantee his due process rights.36 The Supreme Court’s current
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel mandates the provision
of counsel to indigent defendants sentenced to any amount of prison time for
criminal felonies or misdemeanors,37 absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver.38
The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional
safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’ It embodies a realistic
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to
take his life or liberty . . . .
Id. at 462–63 (citation omitted). Justice Black also emphasized a court’s responsibility to ensure
that a defendant either has counsel or has knowingly waived his constitutional right to counsel.
Id. at 468. However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to civil cases. See
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 428 U.S. 18 (1981) (stating that the right to counsel only
applies if the defendant will lose his or her physical liberty).
35. JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 20 (2002). Even
before the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, many colonies recognized the right to assistance by
counsel. Id. at 7–10. This tradition likely stemmed from English common law, whereby
individuals prosecuted for high crimes were afforded the right to “counsel learned in the law.” Id.
at 6. The omission of enumerated rights in the proposed draft of the Constitution caused concern
among delegates, and it was argued that “the right to obtain legal assistance was ‘as necessary
under the general government as under that of the individual states.’” Id. at 15, 17 (quoting Open
Letter from Brutus to the Citizens of the State of New York (Nov. 1, 1787), in J.R. POLE, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST 40 (1987)).
36. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). In Powell, the Supreme Court found
that an Alabama state court’s failure to assign counsel to indigent black defendants on capital rape
charges constituted “a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id. at 49, 71; see also NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMMITTEE, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT,
JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 18–19 (2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (noting that
the holding in Powell was “limited to capital proceedings in state criminal courts”).
37. See TOMCOVICZ, supra note 35, at 59–60 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74
(1979)) (explaining that to meet this mandate, judges must make an initial determination of
whether a prison sentence could result, no matter the length). Any sanction not involving jail
time, such as a fine or a term of probation, does not trigger a defendant’s constitutional right to
counsel. Id. at 59. The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel attaches at the outset of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings, whether preliminary or formal in nature. See Rothgery
v. Gillespie Cnty, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398–99
(1977)) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment applies when the defendant first appears before a
judicial officer); see also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (providing that the Sixth
Amendment attached after the commencement of adversarial proceedings); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1967) (noting that the accused is guaranteed counsel at any phase
of his prosecution when the absence of counsel may hinder his right to a fair trial, whether in or
out of court).
38. See Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). A defendant makes a valid waiver
of the right to counsel when he knowingly and intelligently relinquishes the “traditional benefits
associated with the right to counsel.” Id.
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In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court made the Sixth Amendment’s
right to counsel provision obligatory on the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,39 asserting that “reason and reflection” led to the “obvious truth”
that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be ensured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.”40 Gideon underscores the importance of a defendant’s
counsel in a criminal proceeding, classifying attorneys in criminal cases as
“necessities, not luxuries.”41 The Supreme Court further extended the right to
counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin, holding that, absent a knowing waiver, a
person may not be imprisoned regardless of the offense’s classification, unless
represented by an attorney at trial.42 In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court
clarified that the right is absolute for indigent defendants when incarceration is
a possible outcome, even if the sentence is for just one day.43 Today, the

39. 372 U.S. 335, 341–45 (1963). In Gideon, a trial court denied the defendant’s request for
a court-appointed attorney. Id. at 337. On appeal, the Supreme Court found the trial court’s
actions unconstitutional. Id. at 342–43; see also TOMKOVICZ, supra note 35, at 32 (noting that
the court in Gideon concluded that “due process mandates a general entitlement to appointed
representation in state trials”). Justice Black, speaking for the majority in Gideon, declared that
“[e]ven the intelligent and educated layman . . . requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him.” Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68–69).
40. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. Justice Black stated,
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before
impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble
idea cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers
without a lawyer to assist him.
Id.
41. See id. (“That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-spread belief that lawyers
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”).
42. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). In Argersinger, the indigent defendant appealed his conviction
and ninety-day jail sentence from a Florida state court for carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 26.
The defendant asserted that because no counsel was appointed, he was unable to present a proper
defense. Id. In its opinion, the Supreme Court characterized misdemeanor courts as “assembly
line[s],” wherein the workload created by the volume of cases could result in fair trials giving
way to expeditious ones. Id. at 34–35. The Court further lamented that indigent defendants at
these speedy trials will be “numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on their
way.” Id. at 35–36. Therefore, the Court found that the same concerns of due process and loss of
liberty implicit in a felony trial are also present with misdemeanor charges because of the
possibility of incarceration. Id. at 38.
43. 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). In In re Gault, the Supreme Court also applied the right
to counsel to juvenile delinquency proceedings, stating that “[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of
counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
regularity of proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002)
(applying the right to counsel to a suspended sentence).
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constitutional right to counsel is one of the most cherished and respected rights
in the American judicial system.44
B. Tribal Sovereignty and the Right to Counsel as Applied to Indian
Governments Through the Indian Civil Rights Act
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, does not extend to
defendants in Indian tribal courts.45 Even though members of Indian nations
are United States citizens,46 Indian tribes retain “inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty which has never been extinguished”47 and in deference to this
“quasi-sovereign status,”48 Congress does not impose constitutional limitations
on tribal nations.49 In Talton v. Mayes, when deciding whether the Fifth
Amendment applied to the Cherokee Nation, the Supreme Court stated that
because “the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation
existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the [Bill of

44. See John Pollock, The Great Divide: Gideon and Civil Cases, 14 THE YOUNG LAWYER
(January
2010),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing
/young_lawyer/yld_tyl_jan10_divide.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that media has provided the
public with “common knowledge” that defendants have a fundamental right to counsel in criminal
proceedings).
45. See John M. Sands, No Right to Counsel in Tribal Prosecutions, 27 THE CHAMPION 45,
45 (2003).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2006) (extending citizenship in 1924 to Native Americans “born in
the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian or other aboriginal tribe”).
47. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978), superseded by statute, Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196
(2004). In Wheeler, the Court described Indian tribes’ sovereignty as “unique and limited [in]
character[,] . . . exist[ing] only at the sufferance of Congress and . . . subject to complete
defeasance.” Id. at 322–23. Until an act by Congress, “tribes retain their existing sovereign
powers” that stem from their autonomous state prior to European colonization of North America.
Id.; see also Vincent C. Milani, The Right to Council in Native American Tribal Courts: Tribal
Sovereignty and Congressional Control, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (1994); Judith Resnik,
Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671,
690–94 (1989) (providing a thorough discussion of the relationship between Indian tribes and the
federal government).
48. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1283, 1291 (noting that the concept of limited sovereignty
was first presented by Chief Justice John Marshal in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1 (1831), when he referred to Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations”). Indian nations
retain special rights to organize their societies in a traditional manner according to their customs.
Case Comment, Equal Protection Under the Indian Civil Rights Act: Martinez v. Santa Clara
Pueblo, 90 HARV. L. REV. 627, 635 (1977). Fundamentally, “[t]hese special rights stem from a
quid pro quo whereby [the Indian nations] gave up territorial rights in exchange for autonomy.”
Id. at 635 & n.59 (citing Oliver La Farge, Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration
and the American Indians, 311 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 41, 42 (1957)).
49. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008)
(explaining that Congress’s plenary power over tribal governments through the Indian Commerce
Clause and the Treaty Clause could allow it to extend the Bill of Rights in full to Indians); see
also Milani, supra note 47, at 1291.
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Rights].”50 Thus, as the reasoning in Talton suggests, although the rights
Indians possess as citizens of the United States govern their relationships with
the federal government, those rights do not reach into tribal courts.51
Despite the Sixth Amendment’s inapplicability to Indians in tribal court, the
ICRA ensures that Indians have due process rights and other protections found
in the Bill of Rights.52 These protections assure that a tribal government will
not infringe upon an Indian’s rights.53 However, unlike the broad right to
counsel enjoyed by criminal defendants in state and federal courts, the ICRA
“merely provides that no tribe shall ‘deny to any person in a criminal
proceeding the right . . . at his own expense to have the assistance of
counsel.’”54 In effect, the right to counsel offers no recourse for Indians
incapable of affording such assistance.
The government’s policy of promoting self-governance, rather than
assimilation,55 has allowed Indian nations to develop their own judicial
50. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). In its holding, the Supreme Court
emphasized the “semi-independent position” of Indian tribes, and expounded:
[T]hese relations are equally difficult to define. [Indian tribes] were, and always have
been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal
relations; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union, or of the state
within whose limits they reside.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Elise Helgesen, Allotment of Justice: How U.S. Policy in Indian
Country Perpetuates the Victimization of American Indians, 22 U. FLA. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 441, 444
(2011) (discussing early Supreme Court cases that articulated the quasi-sovereign status of Indian
nations).
51. See Case Comment, supra note 48, at 627.
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). Similar to the restrictions placed on the federal
government through the Bill of Rights, the ICRA provides that tribal governments must provide,
among other things, freedoms of speech, religion, press, assembly, and petition as required by the
First Amendment, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures as required by the Fourth
Amendment, freedom from double jeopardy and self-incrimination as required by the Fifth
Amendment, and freedom from excessive bail, and fines, or infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1)-(7); see also Milani, supra
note 47, at 1284 (explicating that the ICRA made most of the Bill of Rights applicable to the
tribes); Resnik, supra note 47, at 728 (noting that most of the Bill of Rights’ protections apply to
Indian tribes).
53. See Case Comment, supra note 48, at 627 (describing how the ICRA protects Indians
within their internal tribal governments).
54. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1284 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2006)) (“Unless tribal
law itself grants the right to a court-appointed professional attorney, an indigent defendant in
tribal court must face trial uncounseled.”).
55. See Kevin Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403, 435
(2004) (explaining that all branches of the government have agreed that decision making should
be shifted to tribal governments if possible). Before the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was
passed in 1934, assimilation was the favored policy towards Indian nations. Milani, supra note
47, at 1281. The IRA shifted that policy towards self-determination and self-governance. Id.
Since then, additional legislation, such as the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
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systems according to their members’ needs and each tribe’s unique history,
culture, and traditions.56 As a result, although some tribes, in response to their
members’ needs, have passed laws providing for court-appointed lawyers,57
economic limitations have prevented others from doing the same.58
Recently, the Obama administration has made a concerted effort to increase
federal funding for tribal law enforcement and justice programs in response to
the “unacceptable and sobering crime rates witnessed in Indian Country.”59
The administration placed particular emphasis on combating domestic and
sexual violence against Indian women.60 To accomplish this, the TLOA
Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq., and the Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §
458, have continued this trend. See Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/index.htm (last visited May 28, 2012) (explaining the meaning of tribal
self-determination and self-governance).
56. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1281 (noting how tribes are given greater autonomy to
develop their own judicial systems).
57. CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 319
(2004).
58. Id. To provide defendants with some form of assistance, many tribal governments allow
non-lawyers who are generally familiar with tribal customs and law to serve as “advocates” for a
defendant. Id. at 319–20. The federal district court that heard the Cavanaugh case commended
tribal courts’ “herculean efforts” to provide assistance to defendants despite the severe lack of
resources. United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1072 (D.N.D. 2009) (noting that
“many tribal courts are so short on resources and personnel that they constitute a national
embarrassment.”), rev’d, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); see
also Helgelsen, supra note 50, at 454 (explaining the lack of funding for Indian law enforcement);
Milani, supra note 47, at 1290 (expressing concern that some tribal judicial systems “have
become sufficiently complex so that forcing an indigent defendant to proceed without the guiding
hand of counsel may constitute a denial of fundamental fairness”); Washburn, supra note 55, at
442 (describing the lack of resources in tribal governments and its effect on the criminal justice
system). But see Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to Stopping Violence Against Indian
Women Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 16 (2007) (prepared statement of
Alexandra Arriaga, Director of Government Relations, Amnesty International, U.S.A.) (arguing
that tough sexual violence prosecution does occur in tribal court, despite the lack of funding, by
imposing consecutive sentences for several offenses and sanctions other than imprisonment, such
as restitution, community service, and probation).
59. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Awards $118 Million to Enhance,
Support
Tribal
Justice
and
Safety
(Sept.
14,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-asg-1183.html; see also Cavanaugh, 680 F.
Supp. 2d at 1071 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 3651(3) (2006)) (acknowledging that the violent crime rate
on Indian lands is twice the national rate).
60. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Associate Attorney General Tom Perrelli Speaks at the
Four
Corners
Indian
Country
Conference
(Sept.
14,
2011),
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/asg/speeches/2011/asg-speech-110914.html (proposing legislation
that seeks to combat the growing violence epidemic against women in Indian Country).
Government studies have shown that sexual violence against American Indian and Alaska Native
women is more prevalent than among other women in the United States. See, e.g., AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE 2 (2007). It has been estimated that Indian women are 2.5
times more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than other women in the United States, and
more than one in three Indian women will be raped in their lifetimes. Id. Recent studies suggest
that these numbers actually underestimate the extent of sexual violence against Indian women.
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provided additional tools to tribal governments to increase public safety61 and
amended the ICRA to require tribal governments to provide an indigent
defendant “effective assistance of counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by
the United States Constitution and at the expense of the tribal government.”62
However, this requirement is only applicable when a tribal court is seeking to
impose a prison term of more than one year.63 Therefore, tribal courts remain
unobligated to provide indigent defendants with counsel when exercising
jurisdiction over criminal offenses when prison sentencing is less than a year.64

Id. In 2007, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Byron Dorgan, commented
that the prevalence of these “crimes against Indian women have a demoralizing and long-term
effect on the fabric of an entire community.” Examining the Prevalence of and Solutions to
Stopping Violence Against Indian Women Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 2
(statement of Sen. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
61. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2010)). Congress found that
due to the high volume of criminal activity in Indian territories, federal and state cooperation and
assistance were necessary for public safety in Indian Country. TLOA § 202(a), 124 Stat. at
2262–63. In accord with this finding, the stated purposes of the TLOA include:
(1) to clarify the responsibilities of Federal, State, tribal, and local governments with
respect to crimes committed in Indian country; (2) to increase coordination and
communication among Federal, State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies; (3) to
empower tribal governments with the authority, resources, and information necessary to
safely and effectively provide public safety in Indian country; (4) to reduce the
prevalence of violent crime in Indian country and to combat sexual and domestic
violence against American Indian and Alaska Native women; (5) to prevent drug
trafficking and reduce rates of alcohol and drug addiction in Indian country; and (6) to
increase and standardize the collection of criminal data and the sharing of criminal
history information among Federal, State, and tribal officials responsible for responding
to and investigating crimes in Indian country.
§ 202(b), 124 Stat. at 2263; see also Angela R. Riley, Indians and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675,
1720 n.299 (2012) (reviewing the relevant provisions of the TLOA).
62. TLOA § 234(c), 124 Stat. at 2280.
63. See id.; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 59, at 29 (discussing the
shortcomings of the ICRA and its amendments and noting that the law sends a message that
“tribal justice systems are only equipped to handle less serious crimes”).
64. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f a tribe elects
not to provide for the right to appointed counsel through its own laws, Indian defendants in tribal
court have no Constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel unless sentenced to a term of
incarceration greater than one year.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012). Note that the TLOA
amended the ICRA to allow for sentencing up to three years per offense in tribal court, and up to
nine years per case. See TLOA § 234. Federal courts have jurisdiction over certain intra-Indian
crimes, such as rape, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and arson. See Milani, supra note 47, at
1286.
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C. Recidivism and the Domestic Assault Habitual Offender Provision of the
Violence Against Women Act
Using a defendant’s criminal history, whether to increase sentencing or to
establish an essential element of a recidivist statute,65 is an “important means
of crime control through incapacitation of likely future offenders.”66 The
practice of increased sentencing for repeat offenders stems from the notion that
a defendant’s criminal history is “a good predictor of the risk that he will
commit a crime in the future,”67 and that a defendant “with a criminal history is
more culpable” and thus more deserving of a higher sentence than a first-time
offender.68
Consideration of the levels of domestic violence69 in the United States is
sobering,70 especially given the exorbitantly high recidivism rates of
offenders.71 This is true even when the abuser has been through the court
system and rehabilitative treatment programs.72 In an attempt to address the
prevalence of domestic violence in the United States and tribal nations,73
65. Recidivism is defined as the “tendency to relapse into a habit of criminal activity or
behavior.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1384 (9th ed. 2009).
66. Washburn, supra note 55, at 441.
67. Id. at 414 (citing Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical
Premises of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 591–92 (2003)).
68. Id. (noting that repeat offenders are more aware of the consequences of their actions).
69. See
Domestic
Violence,
Dep’t
of
Justice
(May
2011),
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (defining domestic violence as “a pattern of abusive
behavior in any relationship,” whether “physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological,”
that is intended to exert dominance over an intimate partner.
70. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 26 (Nov. 2000), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf
(finding that 1.3 million women in the United States report being physically assaulted each year).
71. Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2005) (citing Amend. Section 658 of Fiscal Year 1997 Omnibus
Appropriations Act: Guns Ban for Individuals Convicted of Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic
Violence Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 155 (1997)
(statement of Donna F. Edwards, Executive Director, National Network to End Domestic
Violence)). May’s article focuses on the overall impact of placing restrictions on people
convicted of domestic violence, noting that without intervention from the justice system, abuse
would likely intensify and occur again. Id. at 4 (highlighting how “two-thirds of domestic
violence fatalities involve firearms”); see also United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644 (7th
Cir. 2010) (citing multiple studies to support the proposition that persons convicted of domestic
violence are likely to offend again), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1674 (2011); Barbara Hart, Battered
Women and the Criminal Justice System (1993), in 2 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: FROM A PRIVATE
MATTER TO A FEDERAL OFFENSE 58, 59–60 (Patricia G. Barnes ed. 1998) (noting that when
victims of domestic violence attempt to seek prosecution or leave an abusive relationship, their
abusers are likely to retaliate against them).
72. May, supra note 71, at 3–4.
73. Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding Tribal Efforts
to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CAL. L. REV. 185, 188–80
(2008) (describing generally the prevalence of violence in Indian country and its effect on Indian
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Congress passed VAWA in 1994 as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994.74 VAWA increased penalties and provided grants to
address rape, sexual assault, domestic abuse, and other gender-related
violence.75 In addition, § 117 of VAWA toughened penalties for repeat
domestic and sexual assault offenders by imposing double prison sentences.76
Under the law, an individual charged under § 117, who has two prior final
convictions for domestic assault, faces the possibility of conviction and a
subsequent term of imprisonment up to ten years.77 However, in state and
federal courts, prosecutors are unable to use prior uncounseled criminal
convictions that had the possibility of jail time as evidence to provide the basis

women); see also Timothy Williams, High Crime but Fewer Prosecutions on Indian Land, N.Y.
TIMES, February 21, 2012, at A14 (reporting that “[t]he country’s 310 Indian reservations have
violent crime rates that are more than two and a half times higher than the national average,” yet
federal prosecutors file charges in less than half of sexual assault cases, leaving tribal members
frustrated with the “second-class system of justice that encourages law breaking”).
74. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38 (1993).
The Violence Against Women Act is intended to respond both to the underlying
attitude that this violence is somehow less serious than other crime and to the resulting
failure of our criminal justice system to address such violence. Its goals are both
symbolic and practical; the act is intended to educate the public and those within the
justice system against the archaic prejudices that blame women for the beatings and the
rapes they suffer; to the women the support and the assurance that their attackers will
be prosecuted; and to ensure that the focus of criminal proceedings will concentrate on
the conduct of the attacker rather than the conduct of the victim.
Id. Although Congress has consistently reauthorized VAWA since it was first passed in 1994,
Congress has yet to reauthorize the law in 2012 (as of August 31, 2012) due to disagreement
along partisan lines between the House and the Senate over additional contentious provisions,
including new protections for immigrants, gays, and students, and additional protections for
American Indians. Legislation Left Undone as Congress Takes Off, YAHOO NEWS, Aug. 3, 2012,
http://news.yahoo.com/legislation-left-undone-congress-takes-off-195431020.html.
75. See S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 55–57.
76. See id. at 3 (specifying that repeat offenders face a term of imprisonment up to twice of
what would otherwise be authorized); ISABELLE SCOTT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 640 (West 2011) (explaining how VAWA provides increased sentences for repeated
offenders); see also United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076 (D.N.D. 2009)
(citing 151 Cong. Rec. S4873-74 (May 20, 2005)) (“The legislative history [of 18 U.S.C. § 117]
indicates the federal offense was created, in part, to prevent serious injury or death of American
Indian women and to allow tribal court convictions to count for purposes of a federal prosecution,
particularly because the Indian Major Crimes Act does not allow federal prosecutors to prosecute
domestic violence assaults unless they rise to the level of serious bodily injury or death.”), rev’d
643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
77. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. During hearings on the proposed bill that
contained VAWA, Representative Charles E. Schumer, then Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Crime and Criminal Justice, emphasized the need to address habitual offenders, stating “[w]e
need tougher sentences for violent repeat offenders [as] [t]he American people demand it and
they are right to demand it.” Correcting Revolving Door Justice: New Approaches to Recidivism:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 2 (1994) (statement of Charles E. Schumer, Chairman).
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for enhancing punishment for a subsequent offense.78 Thus, any prior
domestic assault convictions in state or federal court in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel are unavailable to prosecutors seeking to convict
a habitual offender under § 117.79
D. Burgett v. Texas
In 1967, in Burgett v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that to “permit a
conviction obtained in violation of [the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] to
be used against a person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for
another offense is to erode” fundamental principles of fairness and equality in
the law.80 In Burgett, the defendant was charged with assault with the intent to
murder after using a knife in an attempt to slash the victim’s throat.81 The
defendant was indicted under a Texas recidivist statute requiring proof of at
least two previous felony convictions.82 The prosecution offered evidence of
the defendant’s four prior felony convictions to establish the prior history
element of the statute.83 It was determined on appeal, however, that the
defendant was not offered assistance of counsel during his previous felony
convictions, and that he would be deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights if
the court permitted use of the uncounseled prior convictions as evidence of
criminal history for a new offense.84 In effect, Burgett established an explicit
prohibition against the use of uncounseled criminal convictions that impose a
prison sentence for purposes of proving prior criminal convictions.85
After Burgett, the issue of whether prior uncounseled misdemeanor
convictions could be used to satisfy the prior convictions element of a
recidivist statute remained unanswered.86 In Nichols v. United States, the
78. See 24 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 2321 (2006) (providing that, absent a valid waiver, an
uncounseled conviction cannot be used to enhance punishment).
79. See id. (stating that a conviction secured in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel cannot be used to enhance punishment for a subsequent offense).
80. 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
81. Id. at 110–11. The petitioner was convicted of “assault with malice aforethought with
intent to murder; repetition of offense.” Id. at 110.
82. Id. at 111 & n.3 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (2011)).
83. Id. at 111 (detailing how the indictment contained allegations that the defendant had
four prior felony convictions for burglary and forgery).
84. Id. at 115.
85. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (citing United States v. Tucker,
404 U.S. 443, 447–49 (1972)) (“A subsequent sentence that was based in part on a prior invalid
conviction must be set aside.”). Use of the uncounseled prior conviction as evidence thereby
renders the subsequent conviction constitutionally infirm. Id.
86. The Supreme Court’s per curiam response in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 223 (1980),
to this question was unclear. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 740. In Baldasar, the Supreme Court held
that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used as evidence to convert a
second misdemeanor conviction into a felony. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223–24, overruled by
Nichols, 511 U.S. 738. The multiple opinions in Baldasar left no clear consensus as to the
Court’s reasoning. TOMKOVICZ, supra note 35, at 61–62.
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Supreme Court answered this question by holding that “an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was
imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent
conviction.”87 In Nichols, the defendant’s sentencing term on his charge of
conspiracy to possess cocaine increased due to a prior felony drug possession
and a state misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence (DUI).88
The defendant’s lack of counsel for his DUI adjudication did not concern the
Court, because it found that “concern over reliability raised by the absence of
counsel is tolerable when a defendant does not face the deprivation of his
liberty” by incarceration.89 Thus, Burgett and Nichols prohibit prosecutors’
use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor or felony convictions as evidence to
enhance the sentence for a subsequent conviction, unless the prior conviction
did not result in incarceration.90
D. A Circuit Split over the Use of Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in
Federal Court to Fulfill the Prior History Element of a Recidivist Statute
Although the law regarding the use of uncounseled convictions as a basis for
enhancing a sentence is well-established, U.S. courts of appeal disagree on the
law regarding the use of such uncounseled convictions attained in tribal courts
for subsequent cases in federal court.91 The Ninth Circuit first addressed this
issue in United States v. Ant, holding that a defendant’s uncounseled guilty
plea in tribal court violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
and is therefore inadmissible as evidence in future cases in federal court.92
Two decades later, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits considered the same
important issue, but reached a different legal conclusion.93
1. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Ant
In 1989, in United States v. Ant, the Ninth Circuit held that even though the
defendant’s uncounseled guilty plea in tribal court complied with tribal law
and the ICRA, it was nevertheless inadmissible in federal court because the
prior conviction would have been constitutionally infirm if it had been
87. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49.
88. Id. at 740.
89. Id. at 750 (Souter, J., concurring).
90. See 24 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAW § 2321 (2006) (specifying that an uncounseled conviction
may not be used to enhance a subsequent punishment if the prior conviction resulted in
incarceration).
91. Compare United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011) (allowing the
use of an uncounseled conviction from tribal court in federal court), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542
(2012), and United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000–01 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
use of an uncounseled tribal conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012), with United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1989)
(determining that uncounseled pleas in tribal court are not admissible in federal court).
92. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1395.
93. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000–01.
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rendered in state or federal court.94 The defendant, Francis Floyd Ant, was
arrested for the murder of his niece whose body was found on the Northern
Cheyenne Indian Reservation.95 Ant subsequently was arraigned in the
Northern Cheyenne tribal court.96 The tribal court advised Ant of his right to
counsel at his own expense pursuant to the tribe’s laws and the ICRA.97
However, Ant waived his right to obtain counsel, pled guilty to assault and
battery, and was sentenced to six months in jail.98 During Ant’s indictment in
federal court for voluntary manslaughter for the same incident,99 federal
prosecutors sought to introduce Ant’s tribal court guilty plea as evidence of
guilt.100
The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s finding that Ant’s guilty plea
complied with tribal law and the ICRA,101 but proceeded to examine
independently the “constitutional validity of Ant’s earlier tribal court guilty
plea,” as if it had been made in federal court.102 The court determined that the
available facts did not support a conclusion that, under federal standards, Ant’s
waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent. This led to a

94. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1395 (determining that, as a matter of first impression, a valid guilty
plea, under tribal law and the ICRA, is inadmissible in federal court).
95. Id. at 1390. The Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation is located in southeastern
Montana. See NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE (2011), http://www.cheyennenation.com/index.html.
96. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390.
97. Id. at 1390–92. The applicable law of the court in which Ant pleaded guilty states that
“[a]ny Indian charged with an offense, . . . at his option and expense, may be represented in
Tribal Court by professional legal counsel, or, by a member of the Tribe.” Id. at 1391–92 (citing
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Law, Revised Law and Ordinances of the Northern Cheyenne
Reservation of Montana, Ch. 1, § 9). According to the ICRA, “[n]o Indian tribe . . . shall . . .
deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right . . . at his own expense to have assistance of
counsel for his defense.” 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2006 & Supp. VI 2011). Notwithstanding the
ICRA’s due process clause, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no federal right to appointed
counsel in tribal criminal proceedings. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 1976).
Hence, Ant’s right to counsel in tribal court extended only to counsel that he could afford. Ant,
882 F.2d at 1391–92.
98. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1390–91.
99. A subsequent prosecution by the federal government following a tribal conviction for an
offense arising under the same incident is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Milani,
supra note 47, at 1286 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 315 (1978), superseded by
statute, Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301, as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541
U.S. 193 (2004)) (“Double jeopardy does not bar a prosecution in federal court under the Major
Crimes Act, where the defendant has been convicted in federal court of a ‘lesser included offense’
for acts arising out of the same incident.”); see also 40 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 497–99 &
n.1502 (2011).
100. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1391 (explaining how Ant moved to suppress his tribal court
convictions under a theory that these convictions violated the Sixth Amendment).
101. Id. at 1392.
102. Id. at 1393–95.
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finding that the circumstances under which the guilty plea was made were
constitutionally invalid.103
Therefore, in accordance with Burgett, the court reversed the district court’s
decision to admit the guilty plea in federal court.104 By applying the Burgett
standard to Ant’s previous uncounseled guilty plea in tribal court, the Ninth
Circuit effectively held tribal courts to the same constitutional standard
applicable to state and federal courts.105 By excluding previous uncounseled
tribal court guilty pleas, valid under tribal law and the ICRA, the Ninth Circuit
paid mere lip service to the quasi-sovereign status of Indian governments,106

103. Id. at 1394 (“In order for a defendant to effectuate a valid waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the trial court must undertake a thorough inquiry to ensure that the
defendant has made an informed decision. The standard for waiver in the Ninth Circuit is that the
trial court should discuss with the defendant in open court whether the waiver is being made
knowingly and intelligently, with an understanding of the charges, the possible penalties, and the
dangers of self-representation.” (citation omitted)).
104. Id. at 1393, 1395 (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1967)).
105. Id. at 1396 (evaluating whether the defendant’s plea met the requirements of the
Constitution). The majority, in response to a strong dissent, noted that suppression of Ant’s
guilty plea would not denigrate tribal proceedings or violate principles of comity, because the
court was not reviewing the plea’s validity; instead the court argued that it was merely
determining whether the proceedings could later be admitted in federal court. Id. The Ninth
Circuit has also applied Sixth Amendment constitutional standards when determining whether
prior tribal convictions could serve as the basis for enhancing a prison sentence for a subsequent
conviction in federal court. United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled
on other grounds, Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 742 (1994). In Brady, the defendant, a
member of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe, was convicted in federal court of voluntary
manslaughter and assault with a dangerous weapon and sentenced to 180 months in prison. Id. at
845–46. The pre-sentence report recommended a term of 51 to 63 months of imprisonment based
on the offense and criminal history of the defendant. Id. at 846. The recommended range, in
conformance with the United States Sentencing Guidelines, did not take into account the
defendant’s previous assault and misdemeanor convictions in tribal court when evaluating
criminal history. Id.; see Washburn, supra note 55, at 440–41 (“Under current [sentencing]
policy, in the average case, a defendant with a lengthy tribal criminal history will be sentenced in
the same manner as a first time offender, unless the court takes extraordinary steps of an upward
departure.”). The district court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment outside the
guideline range, in part because the court believed that the sentence range was not an adequate
reflection of the defendant’s propensity to commit new crimes. Brady, 928 F.2d at 846; see
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s. (2011) (allowing courts to depart from the normal sentencing guidelines).
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that because Brady was uncounseled during his prior tribal
convictions, these convictions could not be used for the purposes of enhancing sentencing for a
subsequent offense in federal court. Brady, 928 F.2d at 854 (holding that prior tribal court
convictions must be held to the same constitutional standards as convictions obtained in state and
federal court).
106. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (explaining how tribes have
quasi-sovereign status).
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the federal policy of tribal self-governance,107 and the belief that tribes are
allowed to craft their own judicial systems.108
2. Eighth and Tenth Circuits: United States v. Cavanaugh and United
States v. Shavanaux
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have reached a different conclusion, holding
that uncounseled convictions in tribal court are admissible in federal court for
purposes of establishing prior criminal history.109
In United States v. Cavanaugh, the defendant, a member of the Spirit Lake
Nation, was charged with assaulting his common-law wife.110 A federal
prosecutor charged the defendant as a “habitual offender” under 18 U.S.C. §
117 of VAWA due to the defendant’s prior tribal court convictions for
domestic assault.111 The district court dismissed the case because Cavanaugh’s
prior convictions were uncounseled and resulted in incarceration.112 The court
determined that introduction of the prior uncounseled tribal court convictions
violated the defendant’s right to counsel and due process when offered to
prove an essential element of a federal statute.113
On review, the Eighth Circuit reversed, noting that “the ‘gap’ in the right to
counsel caused by incomplete extension of Sixth Amendment coverage to
Indian tribes” presents difficulties.114 The court found that the defendant’s
prior convictions involved no actual constitutional violations because tribal
courts are outside the bounds of the Constitution; therefore, the court was not
“free to preclude use of the prior conviction merely because it would have been

107. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (detailing how federal government policy
shifted from assimilation to self-governance).
108. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text (explaining how the federal government
allows, and encourages, tribes to develop their own judicial systems).
109. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (admitting the prior
tribal conviction), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d
993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the prior uncounseled tribal conviction was admissible in
federal court), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
110. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594.
111. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 593–94; see also 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2006).
112. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594 n.1 (noting that the district court and appellate court
concluded that the prior convictions resulted in incarceration solely based on the defendant’s
statements).
113. United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076 (D.N.D. 2009) (distinguishing
Ant on the facts and noting that the uncounseled tribal court convictions were “not being offered
in this case for purposes of sentencing enhancement, for purposes of impeachment, or as evidence
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)”), rev’d 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542
(2012). The court stated that it was “unable to contemplate another situation in which it would
permit a party to introduce evidence obtained in violation of the United States Constitution and
allow it to be offered as substantive evidence to prove an essential element of a federal offense.”
Id. at 1076.
114. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604.
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invalid had it arisen from a state or federal court.”115 Thus, the court held that,
with no purported irregularities or claims of innocence, the defendant’s prior
uncounseled criminal history was admissible to prove the pertinent essential
element of 18 U.S.C. § 117.116
Similar to Cavanaugh, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Shavanaux held
that a defendant’s uncounseled prior domestic assault convictions in tribal
court, valid under the ICRA, were admissible in subsequent federal
prosecutions.117 The defendant, a member of the Ute Indian Tribe, was
indicted in federal court for assaulting his domestic partner under 18 U.S.C. §
117.118 As in Cavanaugh, the prosecutor offered evidence of Shavanaux’s two
prior domestic assault convictions in tribal court to establish the habitual
offender element of the statute.119 The Tenth Circuit found that even though
the defendant was neither represented by counsel nor offered the right to
appointed counsel under tribal law120 and the ICRA, the Ute tribal court
convictions were admissible in federal court for a subsequent case because
they did not violate the Sixth Amendment.121
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit in Ant, the court in Shavanaux found that
even though a tribal prosecution does not afford all of the rights guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights, the absence of court-appointed counsel did not make the
convictions unconstitutional.122 Following this syllogism, the Tenth Circuit
stated that the “[u]se of tribal convictions in a subsequent prosecution cannot

115. Id. Compare State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245–46 (Mont. 1003) (allowing the
use of a prior uncounseled tribal conviction to enhance DUI charges in state court and reasoning
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to tribal court proceedings), with
United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 2011) (refusing to admit into evidence an
uncounseled tribal conviction based on a guilty plea because the conviction was obtained in
violation of the Sixth Amendment).
116. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605; see also 18 U.S.C. § 117 (2006).
117. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1001 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 1742 (2012).
118. Id. at 995.
119. Id. at 995–96; see 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (outlining the habitual offender provision of
VAWA).
120. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 996. The pertinent section of the Ute Indian Tribe’s Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that
[i]n all criminal proceedings . . . The Defendant may represent himself or be
represented by an adult enrolled Tribal member, or by any attorney admitted to practice
before the Ute Tribal Court, but no Defendant shall have the right to have appointed
professional counsel provided at the Tribe’s expense.
UTE INDIAN R. OF CRIM. PROC. 3, available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/uteuocode
/utebodyt12.htm.
121. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 996–97 (noting that the Bill of Rights does not “constrain”
Indian tribes).
122. Id. at 997.
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violate ‘anew’ the Sixth Amendment . . . because the Sixth Amendment was
never violated in the first instance.”123
The court in Shavanaux also emphasized the importance of recognizing
valid tribal court convictions under principles of comity, “‘requir[ing] that a
court give full effect to the valid judgments of a foreign jurisdiction according
to that sovereign’s laws.’”124 The court was compelled by the notion that the
failure to recognize tribal courts’ convictions would undermine the ICRA’s
goal of promoting self-governance.125 To this end, the Tenth Circuit cited
multiple court opinions for the proposition that federal courts should liken
Indian tribes to foreign states when considering whether to recognize tribal
court convictions.126 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Wilson v. Marchington
found that “[f]oreign-law nations are not per se disharmonious with due
process” even though their laws do not reflect “common-law notions of
procedure.”127
II. A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION: A VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL OR AN EXTENSION OF COMITY?
As the court in Cavanaugh rightly noted, when using prior uncounseled
tribal court convictions in subsequent federal proceedings to fulfill the habitual
offender element under section 117 of VAWA, an inherent tension exists
between respecting a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel and affording
deference to the laws and procedures of semi-sovereign tribal governments.128

123. Id. at 998 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 999 (quoting State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003)). A “valid”
foreign judgment is one that, according to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 482, is
obtained through “procedures compatible with due process of law” and is rendered by a court
with appropriate jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.
125. Id. at 1000. The court warned, however, that “‘[e]xtending comity to tribal judgments is
not an invitation for the federal courts to exercise unnecessary judicial paternalism in derogation
of tribal self-governance.’” Id. at 999 (quoting Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
126. Id. at 998 (citing Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987), MacArthur v. San
Juan Cnty, 309 F.3d 1216, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 2378 (2010), Burrell v.
Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2006), Marchington, 127 F.3d at 810, and Spotted Eagle,
71 P.3d 1239, 1245–46 (Mont. 2003)).
127. Marchington, 127 F.3d at 811; see also Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 999 (“Unless a tribal
conviction has been vacated through habeas proceedings or on other grounds, it constitutes a valid
conviction for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) and its use does not violate a defendant’s right
to due process in a federal prosecution.”).
128. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (“This tension exists
because the tribal-court ability to impose a term of incarceration of up to one year based upon an
uncounseled conviction is inconsistent with Gideon v. Wainwright . . . and Scott v. Illinois.”),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); see also id. at 606 (Bye, J., dissenting) (noting that “the lack
of clarity [in case law and Supreme Court jurisprudence] means reasonable decision-makers are
likely to differ on the conclusions they reach with respect to allowing or prohibiting such use of
an uncounseled tribal court conviction”).
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The lack of clear direction from the Supreme Court and Congress has caused
divergent opinions among the lower courts as evidenced by the incongruous
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit decisions.129
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Burgett Approach
As the Supreme Court held in Burgett v. Texas, admitting evidence of prior
criminal convictions that were unconstitutional under the standards of Gideon
v. Wainwright is “inherently prejudicial.”130 At the heart of this principle is the
importance of ensuring constitutional due process rights, including the right to
counsel.131 To this end, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ant placed heavy
emphasis on due process considerations when it denied as evidence a
defendant’s prior uncounseled tribal court guilty plea in federal court.132
This approach focuses not on the “validity of the tribal court proceedings
or . . . the tribal justice system, but instead . . . evaluate[s] whether the
convictions satisfy constitutional requirements for use in a federal prosecution
in federal court.”133 The preclusion of uncounseled tribal court convictions in
federal court does not in turn place any restrictions on the tribal court’s use of
that conviction.134 Not only does this approach protect a defendant’s due
process rights, but it has minimal effects on tribal sovereignty since it does not
denigrate the tribal conviction.135
However, as noted by some courts and scholars, this approach presupposes
that uncounseled tribal court convictions are unreliable136 and based on
inadequate due process standards.137 In particular, the failure to recognize
uncounseled tribal court proceedings in federal court is a rejection of the
“underlying assumption implicit in Congress’s enactment of the ICRA . . . that
. . . tribal courts will not deny fundamental fairness, since there is no reason to
assume Congress would legislatively encourage judicial forms which would
foster injustice.”138 Thus, without a careful examination of the tribal court’s
129. See supra notes 20–31 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the Eighth
Circuit and Tenth Circuit split with the Ninth Circuit).
130. United States v. Burgett, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967).
131. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 606 (Bye, J., dissenting).
132. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989).
133. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 607 (Bye, J. dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cavanaugh,
680 F. Supp. 2d. 1062, 1075 (D.N.D. 2009)).
134. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605.
135. Milani, supra note 47, at 1290. Even if a tribal court conviction is not admitted into
evidence to establish an element of a crime or to enhance sentencing of a subsequent crime, the
tribal court conviction and any resulting sentence remain valid and binding. Id.
136. See Washburn, supra note 55, at 433–34 n.163 (postulating that Justice Thurgood
Marshall would consider uncounseled tribal convictions as unreliable for federal sentencing
purposes).
137. See Ant, 882 F.2d at 1394–96.
138. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1289. Congress emphasized tribal self-governance and
self-determination over Sixth Amendment protections, believing that “the incidental loss of the

2012]

Use of Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions Under VAWA

1177

proceedings to determine whether due process standards were met,139 courts
applying the Burgett approach may exclude sufficiently valid and
fairly-rendered convictions.
This approach has a discouraging impact on the intended effect of recidivist
statutes, such as VAWA’s habitual offender provision. The Burgett approach
prioritizes constitutional due process considerations, especially an indigent
defendant’s right to appointed counsel, over imposition of enhanced sentences
for Indian domestic violence recidivists.140 The Ninth Circuit’s narrow focus
on due process impedes the joint efforts of Indian tribes and the federal
government to bring national attention to the domestic violence epidemic in
Indian country and to punish Indian recidivists proportionally.141 Instead, a
case-by-case review of the prior proceedings to determine whether there was
unfair prejudice to the uncounseled defendant would help these efforts, while
also preserving the defendant’s due process rights.
B. A Comity Approach
As noted in both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux, questions regarding the
Tribal nations are
legitimacy of tribal proceedings still remain.142
semi-sovereign entities shaped by a unique relationship with the U.S. federal
government and centuries of history, tradition, and culture.143 The Cavanaugh
and Shavanaux courts were concerned that the federal courts’ failure to
recognize uncounseled tribal court convictions, which complied with tribal law
and the ICRA, would disparage tribal courts and “reflect[] a lack of regard for
By advocating for a
the legitimacy of tribal proceedings.”144
comity-like approach145 to tribal court proceedings, in which federal courts
individual rights of the [Indian] defendants [was] an acceptable consequence” in light of
Congress’s “assum[ption] that uncounseled proceedings in tribal courts would not be
fundamentally unfair to Indian criminal defendants.” Id. at 1290.
139. See, e.g., Craig Smith, Full Faith and Credit in Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition of
Tribal Court Decisions Revisited, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1433 (2010) (explaining that state courts
may be wary of accepting tribal decisions without an examination of the process the tribal courts
offered the parties). Smith’s article, which primarily discuses full faith and credit, is insightful
when discussing issues of comity. See Brian S. Faughnan, Half Full Faith and Credit is No Full
Faith and Credit At All: Tennessee’s Unconstitutional Interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and Other Deficiencies in Modern Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28
U. Mem. L. Rev. 1135, 1139 (1998) (explaining that both principles of comity and full faith and
credit apply to the enforcement of judgments).
140. United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1077 (D.N.D. 2009), rev’d 643 F.3d
592 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
141. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (explaining how the federal government
has increased funding to tribal law enforcement, particularly for domestic and sexual violence).
142. See supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing tribal semi-sovereign status).
144. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1300.
145. See Smith, supra note 139, at 1394 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64
(1895)). In Smith’s article, he explains that “comity [is] a doctrine that the Supreme Court
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recognize foreign court rulings, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits placed greater
emphasis on acceding to the validity of Indian courts’ judgments.146
Under this approach, courts have analogized tribes to foreign nations147 as
well as to states.148 Similar to foreign nations, tribes are not restricted by the
Bill of Rights.149 However, dependence on the federal government and
Congress for funding as well as recognition likens the relationship between
tribes and the federal government to the relationship between the federal
government and the states.150 Whether compared to foreign nations or states,
the unique relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government is
readily apparent, and the resulting intricacies of tribal-federal jurisprudence are
easy to recognize.151
A comity approach toward uncounseled tribal court convictions152 furthers
the congressional policy of tribal self-governance and empowerment.153 As the
described as ‘neither a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will.’” Id.
(quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64). However, Smith also suggests that a comity approach has
disadvantages, namely that comity’s “dated rhetoric” often causes courts to measure tribal court
standards against a “federal or state normative baseline.” Id. at 1408. This in turn may cloud a
“court’s ability to appreciate the possibilities of a deep diversity model of tribal-national relations,
whereby tribal norms can diverge from federal and state norms and yet still be recognized as valid
expressions of American identity deserving respect and legal recognition.” Id. at 1407–08.
146. See e.g., State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003) (explaining that
Montana courts follow the Tenth Circuit comity approach to tribal court judgments); see also
United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 605 (8th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with Spotted Eagle),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1001–02 (10th
Cir. 2011) (utilizing principles of comity to recognize that the use of the defendant’s prior tribal
conviction in a subsequent federal prosecution did not violate the defendant’s due process rights),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012).
147. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000.
148. See Washburn, supra note 55, at 434 (“Because of the Indian Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment, tribal courts simply have much more in common with the courts of
Arizona or Montana than with foreign courts, even those of Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom, which share common legal roots with American courts.”).
149. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998.
150. See Washburn, supra note 55, at 408 (noting how the EPA is required to treat tribes as
“states”).
151. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (“The condition of the Indian
[tribes] in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other [relationship] in
existence.”).
152. See Karla L. Engle, Red Fox v. Hettich: Does South Dakota’s Comity Statute Foster
Unwarranted State Court Intrusion into Tribal Jurisdictional Authority over Civil Disputes?, 38
S.D. L. REV. 706, 706 & n.1 (1993) (citing S.D. Codified Laws § 1-1-25 (2011)) (specifying
when a court may recognize a tribal conviction through principles of comity). South Dakota state
law contains a provision that recognizes tribal court judgments, so long as they comport with
various requirements including proper jurisdiction and an “impartial administration of justice.”
Id.
153. See Santa Clara Puebla v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (noting that the congressional
intent underlying legislation like the ICRA is to provide tribes with the autonomy to self-govern);
see also notes 55–56 and accompanying text (explaining how self governance allows tribes to
shape their own judicial systems).
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court in Shavanaux commented, failure to extend full recognition to
uncounseled tribal court convictions quietly imposes on tribes Sixth
Amendment standards despite Congress’s refusal to do so when it enacted the
ICRA.154 Although the Ninth Circuit’s ruling did not expressly pass judgment
on the validity of tribal court convictions,155 a tribal court that wants its judicial
rulings to be recognized in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction must conform to the
due process standards of the federal government.156 However, if federal courts
extended comity to uncounseled tribal court convictions, tribal governments
could continue to develop their laws and judicial procedures in accordance
with their own values and principles.
Extending comity to tribal court convictions, including uncounseled
convictions in compliance with the ICRA, effectuates the purposes of
recidivism statutes such as the habitual offender provision of VAWA.157 In
both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux, the prosecutors charged the defendants under
VAWA’s habitual offender provision to obtain higher sentences than would be
permissible under similar statutes that did not account for prior criminal
history.158 The increased sentencing under VAWA’s habitual offender
provision indicates the federal government’s determination to crack down on
domestic violence,159 especially in Indian country.160 Specifically, these
provisions are enacted to protect Indian woman from recidivists and prevent
recidivism.161 Extending comity to tribal court convictions to establish a
record of prior criminal history is a significant and necessary step toward
protecting Indian women from domestic violence.162

154. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1000.
155. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1396 (9th Cir. 2011) (explicating that the court was
looking past the question of validity to determine whether constitutional due process was upheld).
156. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1287–88 (explaining the rationale of the Ant holding and
that it did not conform with applicable Sixth Amendment jurisprudence).
157. See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text (explaining the purposes of the habitual
offender statutes).
158. United States v. Cavanaugh, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066, 1069–70 (D.N.D. 2009),
rev’d, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); Shavanaux, 647
F.3d at 995–96.
159. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (describing the intent of VAWA’s
habitual offender provision).
160. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (detailing how rates of domestic violence
among Native American women are higher than among white American women).
161. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1002 (specifying that Congress passed § 117 due to the high
rates of domestic violence against Indian women and detailing the high incidence of recidivism
among domestic violence offenders).
162. Id.
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III. STRIKING A BALANCE: DEFERENCE TO TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY WITH AN
EYE TOWARDS DUE PROCESS
As illustrated by the scenario at the beginning of this Comment, neither
party involved in Cavanaugh could predict, due to the varying approaches
taken by courts, whether the defendant’s tribal court conviction would be
admitted into evidence. The Supreme Court or Congress must address this
uncertainty in order to “bring greater certainty to litigants in tribal courts.”163
To do this effectively, courts must weigh constitutional due process
concerns164 against the need to recognize legitimate tribal court rulings.165
Courts must also consider whether the Sixth Amendment right to appointed
counsel in federal and state court is commensurate with the Indians’ right to
counsel at one’s own expense as mandated by the ICRA, or whether the
difference is insurmountable.166 Therefore, courts must find a balance. When
considered in the narrower context of the habitual offender provision of
VAWA, the balance must resolve the disparity in sentencing between similarly
situated Indian and non-Indian defendants.167
When determining whether an uncounseled conviction in tribal court can be
admitted in federal court for purposes of enhanced sentencing or establishing
prior criminal history, courts should give substantial deference to the tribal
court’s findings.168 This should be accomplished with the recognition that
even though tribal courts do not utilize exactly the same procedures as federal
courts, they are nonetheless guided by common principles of justice and
fairness.169 In fact, a Tenth Circuit judge, Monroe McKay, testified before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs in 1991 that, despite the limited
resources and funding available to Indian communities, tribal courts are just as
capable of administering justice as federal courts.170

163. Smith, supra note 139, at 1435 (arguing that recognition of full faith and credit will also
advance tribal sovereignty); see also supra note 33 (noting that the petitions for writs of certiorari
in the Cavanaugh and Shavanaux cases were denied by the Supreme Court in 2012).
164. See supra Part II.A.
165. See supra Part II.B.
166. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
167. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1077 (D.N.D. 2009), rev’d 643
F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011) (providing that the result of the case is in accord with placing all of the
defendants on a level playing field), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
168. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 603–04.
169. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (noting the implicit assumption underlying
Congress’s enactment of the ICRA—that tribal courts would ensure fundamental fairness for
defendants in tribal court proceedings, despite the inapplicability of the Sixth Amendment’s right
to counsel to those proceedings).
170. See Milani, supra note 47, at 1294–95.
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However, courts should also independently consider whether prior
uncounseled convictions comport with notions of due process.171 Notably, the
independent examination should resemble the more flexible review standard
employed by the Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh,172 as opposed to the rigid
standard in Ant.173 In Cavanaugh, the court reviewed the prior uncounseled
convictions for domestic assault to determine whether there were any
allegations of irregularities or claims of actual innocence that might imply
disregard for due process.174 This approach advances tribal sovereignty175 by
acknowledging and respecting the legitimacy of tribal practices and
institutions176 while also paying heed to the importance of providing counsel to
defendants.177
IV. CONCLUSION
An indigent defendant’s right to appointed counsel is a fundamental right
that helps ensure the defendant’s due process rights.178 However, because the
Sixth Amendment does not apply to Indian governments,179 and because the
ICRA only mandates that an indigent defendant has a right to counsel at his

171. See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d
1389, 1393–96 (1989) (detailing how the court independently examined the constitutional validity
of Ant’s tribal conviction).
172. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605 (“[I]n the absence of any other allegations of irregularities
or claims of actual innocence surrounding the prior convictions, we cannot preclude the use of
such a conviction in the absence of an actual constitutional violation.”); see also Engle, supra
note 152, at 736–37 (specifying how courts should apply a lenient comity approach).
173. Ant, 882 F.3d at 1395–96 (evaluating whether Ant’s conviction met constitutional
requirements).
174. See Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605.
175. See Helgesen, supra note 50, at 472 (2011) (advocating for federal policies that promote
tribal self-determination). A federal court’s recognition of an uncounseled tribal court conviction
as a valid predicate offense also bolsters the cause of tribal self-determination. Id. (noting that
self-determination policies and the provision of additional resources empower tribal governments
to address the needs of their communities and pronounce judgment on individuals “committing
crimes against their own people”).
176. See id. (“The tribes must be empowered internally with more resources, education, and
training . . . [causing a change that is] systemic . . . [and] long-term, meaning that the government
must commit to granting tribal self-determination.”).
177. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938), overruled in part, 451 U.S. 477
(1981). To be clear, the balance proposed does not disregard the importance of the fundamental
right to counsel, nor does it undercut the progress tribes should strive to make in providing as
many indigent defendants with counsel as possible. This Comment simply evaluates a narrow
circumstance in the context of Section 117 of VAWA, in which uncounseled tribal court
convictions valid under the ICRA and tribal law are used in subsequent federal or state court
proceedings as evidence of prior domestic assault convictions.
178. See supra Parts I.A and I.D.
179. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 337 (2008)
(recognizing that the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes).
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own expense,180 an inherent tension developed regarding the use of
uncounseled tribal court convictions in federal court for purposes of
establishing criminal history under recidivist statutes.181 Not surprisingly,
lower courts are split on the issue and are unable to find a balance between the
Sixth Amendment and principles of comity.182 The diverging decisions
compromise the intended goals of Congress in enacting the habitual offender
provision of the Violence Against Women Act as well as the current
administration’s efforts to address and decrease the prevalence of domestic
violence against Indian women. The Supreme Court and Congress can and
must present a workable solution by instructing courts to give substantial
deference to court proceedings in semi-sovereign Indian nations and to
independently review the tribal court convictions to ensure that the
proceedings complied with tribal law and the ICRA.

180. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
181. See United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 596 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing the
tension inherent in using an uncounseled tribal court conviction to enhance a subsequent
conviction’s punishment), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
182. See supra Part I.E (outlining the circuit split on whether uncounseled tribal court
convictions are admissible in federal court to enhance sentencing).

